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The countries that received trade adjustment loans experieneed
relatively more growth in output than  othercountries did, partly
because of growth in imports and partly because of policies.
The factors that most constrain trade refonm  are macroecon-
omic instability, inadequate  conviction about reform, weak im-
plementation capacity, and conflicts in design.
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During the 1980s, developing countries have  *  Inadequate corviction about the benefits of
addressed trade reform in varying degrees.  (and vested interests against) reform.
There has been major reforn  in exchange  *  Weak implementation capacity.
rate policy, in the reduction of export restric-
tions, and in removing impediments to the im-  *  Conflicts in design.
ports of inputs needed by exporters.
When considering nine performance indica-
Import regimes in many countries have been  tors, trade loan recipients s!iowed stronger
improved by substituting tariffs for quantitative  improvement in performance thgv nonrecipients
restructions. The lowering of import protection  in about two-thirds of the instances.
has been more modest in the face of foreign ex-
change constraints.  Much of the growth in output was associated
with additional impons.  Policy reform had a
Through adjustment lending, the World  positive impact on growth performance.
Bank has supported trade reform in more than
40 countries.  Considering this emphasis, one  Less progress was made in debt indicators.
might expect stronger reforms.  Four factors that
have constrained reform action are:  The evidence supports the need for contin-
ued, stronger efforts to reform trade regime- and
* Macroeconomic instability.  complementary policies as part of adjustment
lending.
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and  A. Yeats. R. Sugui  prepared  the  paper.DBVELOPING  COUNTRY  EXPERIENCE  IN  TRADE  RE0ORM
Introduction
After  a  period  of  brisk  growth  during  1965-81,  gross  domestic
product  (GDP)  and  export  growth  rates  in  developing  countries  decelerated
significantly,  while  current  account  deficits  and  debt  indicators  worsened
sharply  in  the  lat.  19709  and 19809. A major  contributing  factor  was
external  shocks  --  the  oil  price  hikes,  interest  rate  increases  and  their
effects  on the  debt  problem,  and  terms  of trade  shocks  that  continued
through  most  of the  decade  (for  more  details,  see  World  Bank  1988).
Domestic  policy  weaknesses  prevented  the  majority  of  countries  from
adjusting  quickly  to  these  external  shocks. To address  increasing  debt
burdens,  especially  in  the face  of slaggish  world  growth,  many developing
countries  focused  their  attentior.  on export  expansion. In the  majority  of
these  countries,  disincentives  to the  production  of tradables  relative  to
nontradables  needed  to  be reduced. In  particular,  the  antiexport  bias
needed  to  be lessened  by exchange  rate  depreciation,  lowering  export
disincentives,  reducing  import  protection,  or  a combination  of these. In
addition,  reform  has  also included  actions  in such  related  areas  as
infrastructure,  marketing  and  technology  that  are  undertaken  to promote  a
more  internationally  competitive  tr-ade  sector.
During  the  1980s,  many developing  countries  have received
financial  and  policy  support  from  the  World  Bank  and  the  International
Monetary  Fund  for  trade  policy  reform. This  paper  evaluates  these  policy
reforms  using  cross-country  data  and  country  studies. The  analysis
considers  reform  proposals  in the  forty  countries  that  received  trade
adjustment  loans  and  the  extent  of implementation  in  twenty-four  countries- 2 -
for  which  sufficient  data  are  available  (box  1).  The  effect  of reforms  (in
the  incentives  is  also  examined,  as are  changes  ir-  economic  performance  in
countries  that  have received  trade  adjustment  loans  and  have  carried  out
reforms.
Bcx 1:  Trade  Loans  an Country  Grouping
The  analysis  in  this  paper  with  a  significant  trade  reform  component that  wore
approved  during  1979-87 --  eighty-one  trade  loans  to  forty  countries.  Among  the  eighty-one
trade-related  loans,  forty-seven  wero structural  adjustment  loans  (SALs),  tl;rty-two  were
sectoral  adjustment  loans  (SECALe), and  two progra  loans.  Many  of  thes  operations  Included
technical  assistance  components or  were  accomponied by technical  assistance  loans  in  support  of
trade  reform.  Detailed  implemntation  data  were  available  for  only  twenty-four  of  the  forty
countries  for  which  sufficiont  time  had  *lapeed  since  they  had  received  their  first  trade
adjustment  loans.  Most  of  those  twenty-four  countries  received  a  trade  loan  before  1986,
although  a  sligttly  different  group  of  twenty-six  countrels  constitutes  the  pre-1986
recipients.  Among  the  forty  countries,  ton  Ointensive  adjusters  received  three  or  more  trade
adjustment  loans.  Some  Indicators  (such  as  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  composition  of
imports)  are available  for  all  forty  countries,  but  others  (extent  of  liberalization)  are
available  only  for  the  twenty-four,  and yet  others  (offective  protection)  only  for  six  to  ten
cases.  Twenty-throe  countries  In  the  sample wore middle-incom,  countries  and  seventeen  wore
low-income countries  (GNP  per  capita  below  3460 In  1987).
The  full  country  sample comprise  eighty-eight  developing  countries:  the  ninety-five
countries  under  the  World Development  Report  1989 definition  of  developing  countries,  excluding
ton  countries  with  serious  data  problems  (Afghanistan,  Bhutan,  Iran,  Iraq,  Kcmpuchea, Lao  PDR,
Lebanon,  Libya,  Romania,  and  Viet  Nam); but  Including  Gambia,  Quines-Biesou,  and  Guyana  because
thoy  received  adjustment  loans.  Thus the  sample  Includes  forty  countries  that  received  trade
adjustoont.  loans  and  forty-eight  countries  that  did  not.
Extent  of  Reforms
Degree  of  Restrictiveness
In reviewing  commercial  policy  (export  and  import  policy)  reform,
Halevi  (1989)  considered  the  following  restrictions:  export  impediments, 1
import  impediments  on inputs  used  in export  production,  quantitative
restrictions, 2 on both  noncompetitive  and  competitive  imports,  and tariff
rates 3 and  rate  dispersion. Based  on the  evidence,  the  countries  were-3-
grouped  into  three  categories  according  to judgments  on the  antiexport
bias  before  adjustment  lending  for  each  country: low,  medium,  or high. 4
Sufficiently  large  differences  were  detected  to  permit  such  a  broad
classificztion.  Only  Chile  and  Korea  had  a relatively  low  level  of
restrictions:  60  percent  had  a  high level,  and  35 percent  had  a medium
level.
A comparison  with trade  restrictiveness  in  developed  countries
helps  to put  the  initial  restrictions  in developing  countries  In  broader
perspective.  The  weighted  average  tariff  rate  for  fifty  developing
countries  was 26  percent  at the  end  of 1985  according  to  Erzan  et al.
(1966). Adding  other  import  charges  raises  the  figure  to  34  percent. For
OECD  countries  average  tariffs  on industrial  goods  were  estimated  to  be
about  5 percent  according  to a 1980  GATT  report  and  Finger  and  Laird
(1987)  and  are  roughly  of that  order  today. Erzan  et  al.  estimated  the
coverage  of nontariff  barriers  in the  same  fifty  developing  countries  to
be 40  percent  (unweighted)  of import  items  corresponding  to all  tariff
positions  at the  end  of 1985. Finger  and  Laird  provide  a similar  estimate
for  thirty-eight  developing  countries  for  1982. They  also  estimated  that
15  percent  of the  product  categories  of the  eleven  industrial  countries  in
their  sample  were subject  to  nontariff  barriers  in 1984. Laird  and  Yeats
(1988)  provide  a similar  figure  (15.9  percent)  for  all  products  in
fourteen  industrial  countries  in 1986.5 While  the  intent  and  influence  of
tariffs  a-d  nontariff  b&rriers  must  be interpreted  individually  for  each
country,  these  estimates  indicate  that  developing  countries,  on the  whole,
have  a  much  more restrictive  trade  regime  than  do  developed  countries.-4-
What  Was  Proposed
The  intensity  of  proposals  corresponded  to the  initial  degree  of
restrictiveness  in  more  than  half  tfc  forty  countries  that  received  trade
adjustment  loans. In  twelve  of the  twenty-four  countries  with initial
restrictiveness,  reform  proposals  were  also  strong  (for  example,  Ghana,
Jamaica,  Hexico,  and  Turkey). In  six  of  these  twenty-four  cases,  however,
reform  proposals  were  moderate  (for  example,  Bangladesh  and  Yugoslavia),
and  in six  others  they  were  mild (for  example,  Brazil,  Guyana,  and
Pakistan).  Among  the  fourteen  cases  with  moderate  initial
restrictiveness,  nine  had  moderate  or strong  proposals. In  general,  the
correspondence  of the  intensity  of the  proposals  with the  initial  degree
of restrictiveness  was stronger  in  export  policy  than  in import  policy.
Also.  the  intensity  of  the  proposals  was relatively  greater  in  Latin
America  than  in  the  other  regions.
The  main components  of  trade  policy  proposals  under  adjustment
lending  are  summarized  in  table  1.  Although  policy  packages  are  not
uniform  across  countries  because  initial  problems  are  not  uniform,  a
common  thread  is a reduction  in restrictions  on  exports  and  imports  and  a
greater  reliance  on the  price  mechanism,  that  is,  on exchange  rate
depreciation  and  the  use  of tariffs  in  place  of  quantitative
restrictions. 6 The  loan  proposals  were  most  consistent  in  their  attempt
to reduce  direct  impediments  to  exports  and  restrictions  on imported
inputs  used for  export  production.  Reform  of  exchange  rate  policy  was
almost  always  a stated,  or unwritten  but important,  goal. Almost  all
loans  supported  a greater  use  of  price  mechanisms  (for  example,  tariffs  in
place  of quantitative  restrictions),  as  well as reductions  in the  level
and  dispersion  of tariff  rates. Proposed  reductions  in quantitative-5-
Table  1.  Intensity  and  Dlotribution  of  Major  Trade  PolIcy  Retorm Propose'
Among  Forty  Countries  Receiving  World  Sank  Trade  Adjustmnt Loans
Not  Mild  or
Area  of reform  Presnt  presnt  Strong  Moderate  absent
Exchange rate  as  2
Export  prog3otionb  is  7
Proteetion  studies  2P  12
Overall  export  policy  16  15  10
Imports  for  export.  17  16  S
Overall  Import  policy  14  15  11
Nonprotective  quantitative  rostrictions  14  16  10
Protective  quantitative  restrictionse  14  15  11
Tariff  leveiC  7  21  12
Tariff  disporsion  7  24  9
Schedule  of  future  action  6  29  6
Overall  reduction  in  antl-xport  bias  17  12  11
a.  Often  these  were  not  explicit  conditions,  but  understandings  under  the  program.
b.  Removal  of restrictions,  provision  of  export  credit.,  insurance,  guarantee,
institutional  developmnt,  and  the Ilke
c.  Whero reforme  Include  a replacement  of  quantitative  restrictions,  they  are  cousted  in
both  those  lines.
Source: World  Bank  data.
restrictions  were large  in some  cases  but  modest  on average  across
countries  in the  case  of  both  items  competing  with domestic  production
and  noncompetitive  items  (luxuries,  for  example). Over  one-third  of the
eighty-one  trade-related  loan  operations  reviewed  included  technical
assistance  components  or  were accompanied  by technical  assistance  loans
to help  in implementing  reforms  or  carrying  out  studies.
There  has  been  less  attention  under  adjustment  lending,  however,
to reforms  that  would  promote  greater  internal  competition.  Because  mostproposals  were put  together  quickly,  as is  usual  in loans  for  direct
balance  of payments  support,  they  often  included  plans  for  studies  to
identify  future  actions. Sometimes  these  plans  reflected  serious
intentions  to undertake  reform,  but  often  they  served  merely  to  delay
difficult  actions. Not  much evidence  is  available  for  assessing  progress
on these  studies. Proposals  to reduce  protection  for  import-substitute:
have  been  cautious. Most  programs  envisaged  that  some  level  of  effective
protection  would  continue  indefinitely.  In some  cases,  particularly  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa,  additional  incentives  were introduced  for  import
substitution  --  for  example,  higher  duties  on imported  inputs  that
compete  with  domestic  production. (Increasing  the  duties  on imported
inputs  reduces  the  protection  provided  to finished  goods  that  use  them.)
Implementation  Record
For twenty-four  of the  forty  countries  receiving  trade
adjustment  loans,  detailed  implementation  data  are  available.
Implementation  records  were good  for  the  two  of the  twenty-four  countries
that  had  a low  level  of restrictiveness  (Chile)  or antiexport  bias
(Republic  of  Korea)  at the  beginning  of the  1980s. Success  in
implementation  for  the  eight  countries  judged  to  have a  moderate  level  of
restrictiveness  covered  the  range  from  low (for  example,  Malawi),  through
medium  (Panama),  to  high (Mauritius).  Among  the  remaining  fourteen
countries  that  had  high initial  levels  of restrictiveness,  six  of the
nine  countries  with strong  commercial  policy  reform  proposals  Aad
relatively  good  implementation  records  (Ghana,  Madagascar,  Mexico,
Philippines.  Senegal,  and  Turkey).- 7  -
In general,  while  implementation  was  swift  in exchange  rate
adjustment  and  the  removal  of export  restrictions,  countries  in  the
sample  have  been slow  to liberalize  imports. Overall,  trade  reforms  were
moderately  signlficant.  Substantial  actions  were taken  in reducing
export  restrictions  (licensing,  prohibitions,  and  export  taxes).
Restrictions  on imported  inputs  for  exports  have  also  been significantly
reduced. On the  import  side,  switching  from  quantitative  restrictionr
to  tariffs  has  been  slow  on  average,  but several  countries  (Jamaica,
Mexico,  Senegal,  and  Turkey)  have  made substantial  progress. Many
countries  have  adopt-l  tariff  reform  programs. Progress  has  been  most
notable  in veducing  maximum  tariff  rat6s,  limiting  the  number  of tariff
classes,  establishing  a (low)  minimum  tariff,  and  reducing  tariff
exemptions.
The lowering  of  protection  levels,  however,  has  been  modest  on
average. Most trade  regimes  continue  to  maintain  escalated  tariff
structures,  with  higher  tariffs  (and  quantitative  restrictions)  on final
goods  than  on capital  goods  and  low  rates  (and  exemptions)  for
intermediate  and  raw  materials. Tariff  dispersion  has  usually  been
reduced,  but  dispersion  in  effective  protection  is  still  large. This
experience  supports  the  conclusion  of  Michaely,  Papageorgiou,  and  Choksi
(forthcoming)  that  commercial  liberalizAtion  is  a drawn  out  process. For
instance,  four  countries  (Jamaica,  Mexico,  Senegal,  and  Turkey)  of the
fourteen  with  highly  restrictive  trade  regimes  in the  early  1980s  had
achieved  a high  degree  of commercial  liberalization  by 1987-88.
Reform  implementation  has  been  stronger  in exchange  rate  pilicy
than  in  commercial  policy. There  was a larger  depreciation  in the  realexchange  rate  in  most  of the  countries  receiving  trade  adjustment  loans
than  in  most  of the 'thers,  in  part  because  the  higher  debt  and  greater
external  shocks  in the  trade  adjustment  loan  countries  required  larger
depreciation.  The  larger  depreciations  were  aiso  the  result  of exchange
rate  reform,  accompanied  by  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  some  trade
liberalization. 7 A real  depreciation  of the  currency  is an important
liberalization  measure. ln the  presence  of  binding  quantitative
restrictions  on imports,  it increases  not  only  the  price  or tradables
relative  to  nontradables  but  also  of exportables  relative  to importables,
thereby  reducing  antiexport  bias. Moreover,  a large  depreciation  can
eventually  make quantitative  restrictions  redundant,  thereby  resulting  in
a de facto  liberalization  of the  import  regime.
Progresas  and  Constraints  to  Impleomntation
The  degree  of implementation  has  been  highly  variable  across
countries  and  policy  areas. Overall,  price  reforms  have  been relatively
substantial  under  trade  adjustment  programs. Examples  include  removal  of
export  taxes,  introduction  of  duty  drawback  schemes  for  exporters,  and
more uniformity  in  tariffs. But  there  has  been  less  success  in
institutionalizing  and  sustaining  some  of the  price  changes. By and
large,  institutional  reform  has  been limited. There  are  many  instances
of abandonment,  reversals,  and  flip-flops  in  price  policies. Despite
modest  goals,  Yugoslavia  abandoned  reforms,  Kenya  and  COte  d'Ivoire  made
slow  progress,  Morocco  and  Thailand  partially  reversed  their  tariff
policy  reform;  Argentina  reversed  its  reform  of quantitative
restrictions,  and  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia,  Uganda,  and  Zambia  reversed-9-
their  policies  of exchange  rate  auctions. Unless  changes  appear  to be
sustainable,  the  credibility  of actions  and  the  supply  response  to them
are  likely  to  be limited. The sustainability  of reform  measures,
therefore,  ought  to  be a goal  of liberalization  attempts  (see  Rodrik
1988).
Based  on the  sample  of twenty-four  countries  with implementation
data,  background  studies,  and  interviews  with  World  Bank  economists,  four
factors  were identified  as  constraints  to  more thorough  implementation
and  sustainability.  Weak  uacroticonomic  perfonnance  and  Instability  is a
first  impediment.  Economic  instability  and  external  imbalances  are
serious  constraints  to liberalization,  while  export  growth  makes
liberalization  easier. Recession,  inability  to address  inflation,  and
real  appreciation  of the  currency  have  inhibited  trade  reforms  to  varying
degrees  in  Costa  Rica,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  and  the  Philippines.  Balance  of
payments  problems  resulting  from  a fall  in copper  prices  and faulty
exchange  rate  management  contributed  to the  reversal  of  reform  policy  in
Zambia. Export  performance  and  foreign  exchange  availability  also  offset
the  sustainability  of reform. Strong  and  rapid  supply  response  improves
the  sustainability  of reforms  by reducing  the  transition  costs  of reforms
associated  with the  release  of resources  from  previously  highly  protected
sectors. Slow  export  expansion  hurt  Kenya's  liberalization  attempts.
Export  diversification  is  just  beginning  in  Costa  Rica  and  Cote  d'Ivoire,
which  made  more  rapid  progress  in  commercial  policy  reform  but  were  also
vulnerable  to  declining  terms  of trade. Even in  Chile,  the rapid  growth
of  exports  and  the  availability  of foreign  exchange  have  been important
in  preventing  policy  reversals. In  Jamaica,  the  availability  of- 10  -
financing  has  been  crucial  for  maintaining  the  liberalization  effort  in
the face  of  a  worsening  current  account  balance.
A  second  constraint  is Inadequate  government  coamitment  to
reform. In  a number  of cases  in  which  the  governmenL  has  not *owned"  the
program  (Kenya,  Malawi,  Zambia),  implementation  has  been  weak.  The slow
pace  of reform  has in  turn  sometimes  hurt  the  credibility  of the  program
for  the  private  sector,  thereby  diminishing  its  sustainability.
Inadequate  commitment  has  limited  the  sustainability  of reforms,
particularly  in the  highly  indebted  countries  and  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.
Changes  in  political  regimes  and  leadership  have  often  compounded  these
problems  and  have led  to  policy  reversals.  A  related  constraint  is
internal  opposition  to reform. 8 There  are  always  winners  and  losers  from
policy  changes. Resistance  from  losers,  as in  Zimbabwe,  has  often
delayed  or reversed  reductions  in  protection.  In  Yugoslavia,  despite
modest  goals  related  to trade  and  the  foreign  exchange  regime,  political
opposition  (in  addition  to  macroeconomic  instability)  led  to a dilution
or reversal  of  most elements  of the  program.
A third  constraint  relates  to difficulties  in implementation.
Sometimes,  a  country's  limited  administrative  capacity  has  been  a
critical  constraint.  Bangladesh  and  C6te  d'Ivoire  made slow  progress  in
part  because  of administrative  difficulties.  The  introduction  of export
tax  rebetes,  duty  drawback  systems,  and  bonded  warehouses  has  been
subject  to administrative  delays  in  many  cases. Often,  changes  in  policy
require  changes  in  administrative  arrangements  and  capabilities,  if  they
are  to  be successfully  implemented,  (for  example,  import  administration
may  need  to be reorganized  to implement  tariff  reforms). Sometimes,- 1'  -
policy  changes  were predicated  on the  completion  of studies,  which  were
delayed  for  various  reasons  in  a  number  of the  cases  reviewed  (for
example,  Colombia  and  Kenya).
A  general  problem  is  the  lack  of  medium-term  policy  frameworks
within  which  trade  and  other  macroeconomic  reforms  can  be discussed  and
implemented.  Planning  ministries  or departments  in  many  countries
(Colombia,  India,  and  Pakistan,  for  example)  are  well Grganized  for
medium-term  physical  and  financial  planning,  while  finance  ministries  or
monetary  authorities  are  ready  to deal  with short-term  macroeconomic
policies. There  is  often  a  void,  however,  when it  comes  to the
formulation  of trade  and  other  macroeconomic  policies  for  the  medium
term.
Conflicts  among  policy  refore and  weaknesses  in design  are a
fourth  set  of impediments  to reform  implementation.  Inadequate
stabilization  efforts  have  constrained  trade  reform  in  Pakistan  anu
Panama. In contrast,  stabilization  and  trade  reforms  in the  1980s  have
reinforced  one  another  in  Chile,  Colombia,  and  Korea,  where  the  ability
to quickly  regain  external  sector  stability  has  helped  to sustain  trade
reforms. The  targets  of structural  adjustment  and  stabilization  have  at
times  conflicted.  For  instance,  the  imposition  of customs  duties  and
tariff  surtaxes  to increase  revenues  for  stabilization  purposes  in  the
Philippines  has  conflicted  with  attempts  to liberalize  imports. Morocco
increased  import  tariffs,  which  had  been  reduced  in  an earlier  phase  of
reform,  for  revenue  purposes. These  conflicts  may sometimes  be
unavoidable.  Trade  taxes  create  distortions,  so less-distorting,
alternative  revenue  sources  are  preferable.  When  a country  has  a weak- 12 -
tax  system,  however,  some  trade  taxes  may  remain  necessary  in the  short
term  to generate  revenue.
Effects  of Policy  Change
Change  in Incentives
Real  exchange  rate. An indicator  of the  incentives  for  the
production  of tradables  relative  to  nontradables  is  the  real  exchange
rate. Exchange  rate  misalignments  were significant  in the  early  19809
for  the  group  of forty  countries  that  received  trade  adjustment  loans.
Subsequent  adjustments  were  also  substantial  in  a large  number  of cases.
The  adjustments  involved  a series  of devaluations  or institution  of a
crawling  peg, supported  by macroeconomic  adjustments.  Figure  1  compares
changes  in a trade-weighted  multilateral  real  exchange  rate  vis-a-vis
major  trading  partners  for  a  group  of twenty-one  industrial  countries,
the  forty  recipients  of trade  adjustment  loans,  and forty-eight
nonrecipients.  The  domestic  currency  depreciated  in real  terms  by over
22 percent  between  the  periods  1981-83  and  1985-87  for  the  group  of forty
trade  adjustment  loan  courtries,  in  contrast  to 2  percent  in the
nonrecipient  countries  and  a slight  appreciation  in the  industrial
countries. This  implies  that  the  price  of traded  goods  relative  to that
of nontraded  goods  increased  in  the  trade  adjustment  loan  countries.
Real  exchange  rate  indices  provide  an indication  of the  change
in  bias  against  tradable  goods,  but  they  rarely  distinguish  between
exportable  commodities  and  import-substitutes. 9 To  make  that
distinction,  measures  of  changes  in  the  levels  of  effective  protection- 13 -
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21 INDs - twenty-one  industrialized  countries.
40  TALs  - forty  trade  adjustment  loan  recipient  countries.
48  NTALs  =  forty-eight  nonrecipients  of trade  adjustment  loans.
Note:  Increase  in  index  indicates  real  appreciation. This  figure  does
not indicate  initial  currency  misalignments  (for  a discussion  of
'proper"  levels  of  exchange  rates,  see  Williamson  1985).
Source: Trade-weighted  multilateral  index  of the  real  exchange  rate  for
the  various  countries  based  on IMP  data.
for  the  different  sectors  would  be  needed  or  measures  of effective
exchange  rates  for  exporting  activities  versus  import-substituiting
activities.  Individual  country  studies  of effective  protection  and
antiexport  bias  exist  (for  example,  for  Chile,  Colombia,  Kenya.  Korea,
Mexico,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  Philippines,  and  Turkey),  but the  results  are
not  comparable  across  countries.  Comparisons  of even  nominal  protection- 14 -
rates  or the  coverage  of  quantitative  restrictions  are  difficult. In  a
few  cases,  changes  in  protection  levels  over  time  have  also  been  assessed,
but  intercountry  comparisons  of the  changes  are  even  more difficult  than
comparisons  of the  levels.
Import  Liberalization  and  Protection
During  the  19809,  import  levels  in developing  countries  declined
(in  current  and  constanc  prices)  on  average  because  of balance  of  payments
problems,  a.t  did importJGDP  ratios. The  ratio  of  nonfuel  imports  to  GDP
declined  as  well,  although  the  extent  of the  fall  was less  than  for  total
imports. The  reduction  in the  import/GDP  ratio  was significantly  less,
however,  for  countries  associated  with trade  reforms  and  adjustment
lending. As indicated  in  table  2, the  declines  in the  ratio  were
systematically  less  among  countries  that  received  trade  adjustment  loans
than  in the  other  countries.
Direct  examination  of the  conditions  in  trade  adjustment  loans
and  their  implementation  records  indicate  that  import  protection  on
average  has  fallen  modestly  (rather  than  dramatically)  in  most of these
countries. By and  large,  tariff  structures  remain  escalated,  with the
highest  protection  afforded  to final  goods. This  seems  consistent  with
the  evidence  on changes  in the  composition  of nonfuel  imports  since  1980.
If protection  of the  most  protected  goods  (consumer  goods)  had  been
reduced  substantially,  they  would  have increased  as  a fraction  of total
imports,  and  intermediates  used in  their  domestic  production  would  have
decreased  as a share  of  the  total. Instead,  intermediate  goods,  and
capital  goods  to a lesser  extent,  have increased  relative  to consumer
goods  in  the  total  (table  3).- 15  -
Table  2.  Import.  of  Goode  and  Nonfector  Servicee  In  Current  Prices
as  a  Percentage  of  OOP  for  Selected  Country  Croupings,  1UO-66
(unwe ghted  average)
Percontage  chango
1994-6U/  1985-87/
Saple  group  1960  1911  1962  1963  1964  196  196  1W97  1968  1980-82  1981-83
10  Intensivo  trde
loan  reciplints  32.7  83.8  29.4  80.1  81.1  82.0  29.6  31.1  83.1  -2.9*  -0.100
26  Trade  loan
recipients  84.8  84.7  J1.0  29.7  80.6  80.9  29.2  31.7  80.7  -9.3*  -3  8**
40  Trade  loan
recipient.  33.0  83.4 81.6  $0.3  30.7  30.6  29.0  80.3  80.6  -7.7**  -5.6**
43 Nonreciplints  S.61  40.4  86.8  35.6  34.1  83.5  $3.1  32.2  32.3  -14.6  -14.0
68 Developing  countrioe  30.1  87.2  3.56  33.2  32.5  32.3  31.2  31.3  31.4  -41.6*  -10.5
21 Industrial  countries  35.6  85.7  35.1  84.5  36.5  86.9  33.2  32.6  31.5  0.8  -2.5
c  The difterence  in  mans  between the  trade  adjustment  loan  reciplents  and nonreciplents  is
significant  at  the  10-percent  confidence  Interval.
e  The difference  In  moens between the  trade  adjustment  loan  reciplonts  and nonreciplents  is
eignificent  at  the  5-percent  confidence  Interval.
d  Preliminary  estimates.
Source: World  Bank etimates.
Table 3.  Composition of Nonfue!.  Imports at Current Prices in the
Trade Adjustment Lending Countries, 1980-87
(percentage  shares of total nonfuel imports)
Component  1980  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Consumer goods  22.4  20.4  20.2  19.7  18.0  17.9  16.5
Capital goods  31.0  32.6  33.7  32.7  33.1  32.2  32.2
Intermediate goods  46.6  47.0  46.1  47.6  48.9  49.9  51.3
Total nonfuel imports  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
----------------------------------------------------------------- __----------__-
Average value (US$
million)  4,260  3,871  3,492  3,568  3,517  3,818  4,379
Notet  Data are averages for the thirty-seven countries for  which data were
available.
Source:  World Bank data.- 16 -
Information  on individual  countries  shows  considerable  variation
in changes  in impediments  to imports. Chle, Mexico,  Korea,  Turkey,  and
the  Philippines  are  among  the  countries  that  undertook  broad  import
reform. Chile's  import  liberalization,  which  began  in 1975,  has  been the
most  extensive  in recent  time. Quantitative  restrictions  were rapidly
replaced  by uniform  tariff  rates  of 10  to 15  percent  by  mid-1979.
Commercial  policy  reversals  were  corrected  and  coupled  with a substantial
devaluation  during  1983-87,  during  which  time  the  export/GDP  ratio  nearly
doubled. Mexico  implemented  a  major  reduction  in import  restrictions  in
the  mid-1980s,  substantially  reducing  antiexport  bias  and  achieving  a
significant  increase  in  exports. Korea  is  an  example  of sustained
liberalization  and  export  development  over  a long  period  of time. Turkey
carried  out  a  major  trade  reform  in the  first  half  of the  1980s,
transforming  the  economy  from  its  inward  orientation  to a  more  outward-
looking  one,  and  nearly  tripling  its  exportJGDP  ratio  during  1980-87. The
Philippines  began  with a tariff  reform  in  the  early  1980s,  followed  by
substantial  reductions  in quantitative  restrictions  in the  mid-1980s.
Milder  reform  and  even  reform  reversals  occurred  in some  cases.
Colombia,  whose  trade  regime  has  been  characterized  by  remarkable
stability  over  the  past  thirty  years,  undertook  some  export  promotion
along  with  modest  import  reform  in  the  1980s. Kenya  and  Pakistan,  among
many  others,  undertook  only  mild reforms,  although  their  existing  trade
regimes  were quite  restrictive.  Other  cases  --  such  as Yugoslavia  and
Zambia  --  have  involved  policy  improvements  followed  by abandonment  of
,reforms  or  policy  reversals.  Estimates  are  available  on the  effects  of-17  -
trade  reforms  on relative  incentives  in  seven  cases  --  Colombia,  Kenya,
Korea,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Pakistan  and  Philippines.  The  estimates,  however,
are  not  comparable  across  the  countries  since  definitions  and  methods
employed  are  quite  different. In general,  the  effect  of trade  reform  on
antiexport  bias  has  varied,  ranging  from  very significant  reduction  in
Mexico  to iittle  change  in .'akistan.
Relative  Performance  Before  and  After  Lending
Changes  in  performance  indicators  for  trade  adjustment  loan
recipients  compared  with  nonrecipients  are  presented  in  table  4.  To allow
some  time  after  the  first  trade  adjustment  loan,  only  the  twenty-six
countries  that  received  a trade  adjustment  loan  before  1986  are
considered.  The  table  categorizes  average  changes  in indicators  for  trade
loan  recipients  relative  to  nonrecipients  for  the  period  1985-87  compared
to the  period  1981-83  and  average  changes  for  the  trade  loan  recipients
for  the  three-year  period  following  the  first  loan (excluding  the  year  of
the  loan)  compared  with the  three  years  before  the  loan  relative  to the
changes  over  the  same  periods  for  nonrecipient  comparators  (see  Balassa
1988). The  numbers  show  how  many trade  adjustment  loan  countries  in each
classification  performed  better  on  each  indicator  than  their  comparators
after  the  start  of trade  adjustment  lending. The  plus  and  minus signs
indicate  an improvement  or  a  worsening  of the  average  value  of an
indicator  for  the  trade  adjustment  loan  group  in  comparison  with the
average  value  of the  same  indicator  for  the  comparator  group.1 0
There  are important  limitations  to this  type  of  comparison  as
presented  in table  4 (see  Khan  1988,  for  instance  for  a discussion).  Most
important,  perhaps,  the  adjustment  lending  countries  are  not  necessarily- 18  -
Table  4. Performance  Inicatoro  for  Trade  Adjustmnt  Loan Rlciplnt.  Safore  and
After  Trade  Adjustmant Lending:  Twnty-Six  Pre-196  Trade Loon Recipients
vs.  Forty-Eight  Nonrecipienta
Sub-  Highly
Low  IMiddle  Re  Sahonrn  indebted Manufacture.
Indicator  Income  inme  aum  Africa  countries  *xporters
Number  of  trade  loan  reciplents  9  17  26  11  10  7
Numbr of  nonreciplents  21  27  40  10  4  8
Panel  1s  190S-97 coered  to  19 1-g1
GDP  growth  9(,)ee  12(*)**  21  10(.)e*  ,(.)e  "-.)
Investment/OW  SO.)  14(.)  19  9(W)  GO.)  7(  )
Roeal  oxchange  rate  *(,)e  5(*)**  2J  9(.)*  8(0)  7()
Manufacturing  exports  growth  7(.)CO  12(#)  19  10(.)**  1(.)e  4(-)
Import  growth  "(.)C5  12(*)**  20  9(*)e  4(-)  S0C)
Rosource balance/CDP  2(-)  12(e)  14  SC-)  1 0(.)e*  1(-)
Inflation  8(#)*  14(e)  22  10(C)**  7(-)  1(-)
External  debt/exports  6(+)  17(.)e  28  SC.)  10(.)O  so.)
ribt  service/oxports  6(.)  10t-)  16  4(-)  *t-)  7(e)
Share showing  improvementa  0.72  0.77  0.75  0.74  0.58  0.70
(10  intensive  recipient.)  (0.78)  (0.72)  (0.78)  (0.76)  (0.68)  (O.)
(All  40  recipient.)  (0.70)  (0.64)  (0.67)  (0.68)  (0.56)  (0.64)
Ponol 2:  Three years after
compared  to  throe  years before
CDP  growth  S6.)  18(e)  16  8(*)  6SC)  4(e)
InvoctAent/CDP  4(-)  II(C)  15  SO-)  8(O)  4(-)
Real exchange rat.  6(-)  16(+)  21  10(e)  9(e)  7(-)
Manufacturing  exports  growth  7(.)  14(e)  21  9(e)  SC-)  4(*)
Import  growth  6(i)  14(+)*  20  6(e)  5 ()es  (
Resource balance/GOP  SG.)  11(.)  16  8(-)  6(e)  2(+)
Inflation  7(e)  18(.)  20  9(e)  6(e)  4(-)
External  debt/export.  SC()  14(#)  19  7(-)  9(e)  SC.)
Debt  service/export  G(-)  9(W)  14  J(-)  5(-)  4(e)
Share showing improvements  0.60  0.76  0.70  0.64  0.44  0.66
(10  intensive  recipient.)  (0.76)  (0.69)  (0.71)  (0.64)  (0.71)  (0.78)
(All  40  recipient.)  (0.56)  (0.70)  (0-67)  (0.62)  (0.63)  (0.54)
Note:  The nuabers in  the  table  show for  each indicator  the  number  of  trade  adjustment  loan
reciplonts  in  each classification  that  improved In  the  period  after  the  loan compared
with  the  period  before  the  loan  relative  to  the  change over  the  some  period.  for
nonrecipient  comarators.  The year  of  receIpt  of  the  first  loon  in  excluded  from  the
cosparison  in  panel 2.  The plus  and  minus  signs  indicate  an  improvemet  or  a
worsening of  the  average  value  of  an  indicator  for  reciplent.  comred  with  the  change
In  average  value  for  nonrecipient.
*  The  change  In  means  for  the  reciplents  between  the  two periods  relative  to  the  chango
for  nonreciplents  is  significant  at  a  10-percent  confidence  Interval.
cc  The  change  In  means  for  the  recipient.  between the  two  periods  relative  to  the  change
for  nonrecipionts  In  significant  at  a  S-percent  confidence  Interval.
a.  The  share of  tho  product  of  the  number  of  variable.  and  the  numer  of  countries
showing lmprov e  nt  In  the  total.- 19  -
selected  randomly. Many  other  factors  affect  performance  other  than  the
presence  of this  type  of lending  and reforms. Subject  to these  and  other
caveats,  panel  1 shows,  on average,  the  change  in  performance  on the  trade
indicators  between  1981-83  and  1985-87  was  better  for  the  twenty-six  pre-
1986  trade  loan  recipients  than  for  the  forty-eight  nonrecipient
comparators.  The  last  three  rows  in  each  panel  show  the  total  percentage
of  cases  in  which  trade  adjustment  loan  countries  on three  different
classifications  did  better  than  the  others  across  all  nine indicators.
Changes  during  three  years  after  versus  three  years  before  the  first  loan
are  considered  in  panel  2.  The relative  performance  of the  trade
adjustment  loan  recipients  is  usuall weaker  when all  40 recipients  are
considered  than  when the  focus  is  on the  twenty-six  pre-1986  recipients  or
the  ten  intensive  recipients.  Middle-income  countries  performed  better,
on  average,  on  most indicators  than  did  the  low-income  countries.
The  relative  improvements  in the  trade  adjustment  countries  are
most  apparent  in the  trade  and  growth  indicators.  These  improvements  are
probably  attributable  to the  additional  financing  provided  by the  loans,
exchange  rate  adjustments,  and  some  improvement  in the  trade  regime.
There  was a relative  worsening,  however,  with respect  to some  debt
indicators.  This  is  not  altogether  surprising  since  these  countries
borrowed  more  heavily  than  the  others,  but  since  they  also  made  major
adjustments,  the  weak improvements  in  the  debt  indicators  may  have
ramifications  for  the  sustainability  of the  improvements.
Difference  in  Export  Performance
Expansion  of  developing  country  exports,  which  was rapid  in  the
1970s,  decelerated  in the  1980s  to a level  half  that  of the  19709. While- 20  -
Figure  2
EXPORT  GRONTH  FOR  40 TRADE  ADJUSTMENT  LENDING  COUNTRIES
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Source:  World Bank data.
overall  export  growth  was  weaker  in the  19809  (3.6  percent  average  annual
rate)  than  in the  1970s  (6.8  percent),  performance  -as  stronger  for
recipient  countries  (4.5  percent)  than  for  nonrecipients  (2.8  percent)  in
the  1980s. About  one-third  of the  trade  loan  recipients  also  managed  to
increase  their  exports  in recent  years  (1982-88)  compared  with the  longer-
term  trend  (1965-81,  figure  2).  Among  the  ten  intensive  trade  adjustment
loan  recipients  (those  that  received  three  or  more trade  loans),  more than
half increased  their  shares  in  total  exports  to industrial  countries  from
nonoil-exporting  developing  countries.
Manufacturing  exports  from  developing  countries  grew  at an
average  annual  rate  of 7.6  percent  during  1982-87,  while  the  rate  of- 21 -
increase  for  all  exports  was  only  3.1  percent. Particularly  rapid  rates
of increase  in  manufacturing  exports  during  1982-87  were recorded  by
Turkey  (29  percent),  Mauritius  and  Mexico  (25  percent),  Thailand  (20
percent),  Korea  and  Zambia  (around  15  percent),  and  Ghana  and  Morocco  (10
percent  each). Growth  in  manufacturing  exports  was stronger  in the  trade
loan  adjustment  countries  than  in  the  other  countries,  even  when
calculated  using  unweighted  averages  (table  5).  The  growth  rate  for
1982-87  was 9 percent  for  the  loan  recipient  group  compared  with 6  percent
for  the  nonrecipient  group. Although  exports  of primary  products  and
services  have  been  very  important  for  some  countries,  over  time  the  main
contribution  to export  performance  at the  margin  probably  came  from
manufactured  exports.
To improve  performance  in  this  area,  a  realistic  exchange  rate
policy  that  yields  competitive  production  costs,  given  the  productivity  of
labor  in  each  country,  will continue  to  be essential,  as  will  measures  to
enhance  productivity.  Exporters  also  need  access  to  a growing  range  of
domestically  produced  inputs  at  world  prices  and  of  world  quality.
Institutional  and  marketing  support  to export  activities  are  also
especially  strong  among  successful  exporters  while  the  opposite  is true
among  the  poor  performers.
Some  countries  have introduced  export  incentives  while
maintaining  protection  in  the  import  regime. But  unless  protection  is
reduced,  the  incentive  to shift  resources  from  production  for  a  captive
domestic  market  to  a tough  and  competitive  international  market  is likely
to remain  limited. And  as long  as import  controls  remain  in  place,
special  schemes  will  need  to be irtroduced,  such  as duty  drawback  schemes,- 22  -





Indicator/country  group  1960  1W6  1932  1983  1964  1986  1966  1987  19688  1980-82  1981-83
Merchandise  exports
e8  Doveloping  countries  6.4  2.4  2.6  0.1  6.6  5.2  8.7  6.0  4.4  49.0*  19.2**
10  Intensive  trade
loan  recipients  12.1  7.6  7.8  -4.9  11.5  8.6  9.2  7.5  3.5  -11.7*  94.2
26  Trade  loan  recipients  9.1  4.6  2.2  -2.9  7.3  8.6  8.3  7.6  6.1  19.3**  380.600
40  Trade  loan  recipients  7.6  4.7  -0.4  -1.2  6.6  5.0  6.8  5.7  4.1  56.3*0  464.6**
46  Nonrecipients  3.5  0.3  651  1.2  6.5  6.4  1.0  6.8  4.6  44.9  92.4
Manufacturing  exportsb
88  Developing  countries  1e.4  9.  1.2  11.2  9.8  10.6  7.2  5.S  10.7  -6.8*  6.4**
10 Intensive  trade
loan  recipients  26.8  20.2  -3.8  16.6  11.9  9.6  10.2  13.7  17.2  -26 . 9 4.6*
26  Trade  loan  recipionts 18.7  7.8  0.9  6.7  9.0  11.6  6.0  12.7  12.2  -6.2*  92.60*
40  Trade  loan  recipients 26.6  6.6  0.6  10.3  7.4  14.1  11.6  9.9  13.7  1.2**  104.9*
48  Nonrecipisnts  11.9  12.6  1.7  12.1  11.8  7.4  8.6  1.7  7.S  -13.4  -62.2
GDP
88  Developing  countries  38.  3.4  1.6  1.2  2.4  8.1  8.2  2.8  3.3  - 0 .9 0*  34.8**
10  Inteneive  trade
loan  recipients  0.2  2.4  1.1  0.2  2.1  2.7  3.3  4.2  4.1  128.8**  188.7**
26  Trade  loan  recipients  3.4  2.2  0.7  0.6  2.7  8.3  4.2  3.7  3.8  60.2**  214.1**
40 Trade  loan  recipients  2.7  2.8  0.8  0.4  2.2  3.6  3.9  8.2  3.6  63.7*  198.2*
48 Nonrecipients  4.4  8.8  3.1  1.9  2.6  2.7  2.6  1.6  8.0  -29.2  -20.6
*  Differonces  in  means  between  the  trado  adjustmont  loan  recipients  and  nonrecipi-nts  were  significant  at
the  6-percent  confidence  intervol.
cc  Differences  in  means  between the  trado  adjustment  loan  recipients  and  nonreciplents  were significant  at
the  1-percent  confidence  interval.
a.  Preliminary  estimates.
b.  The  definition  of  manufactures  is  froe  the  Foreign  Trade  Statistics,  International  Economics  Department,
World  Bank;  It  includ-e  line  itoem  of  546+.78-68  in  SITC.
Source: World  Bank  data.
export  processing  zones,  ar.d  bonded  warehouses,  to  ensure  that  exporters
receive  special  access  to imported  inputs  at  world  prices. The  successful- 23  -
East  Asian  exporters  have  also  paid  attention  to  easy  access  to foreign
exchange  for  exporters,  preshipment  credit  for  working  capital,  labor
costs,  training,  education,  infrastructure,  technology,  and  marketing  (for
a  discussion  see  Keesing  1988.) Their  exports  have  also  benefited  from  a
favorable  regulatory  environment,  support  for  enterprise  development,  and
a forward-looking  industrial  policy. They  have  also  dealt  successfully
with  protection  abroad  to  maintain  their  prospects  for  market  penetration.
Does  Policy  Matter?
Trade  reform  has frequently  been  included  under  adjustment
lending  during  the  19808  because  of the  belief  that  increased  trade  can
help to  minimize  the  slowdown  in  growth  that  often  accompanies
stabilization.  The  World  Bank  Report  on  Adjustment  Lending  (1988)
suggests  that  short-term  changes  in the  resource  balance  (the  difference
betwcen  exports  and  imports  of goods  and  nonfactor  services)  and  GDP
growth  have  been  negatively  related. Regression  results  for  developing
countries  show  strongly  significant  and  negative  coefficients  for  the
change  in  GDP  with respect  to  a change  in  the  resource  balance  in the
1980s. However,  expenditure-switching  policies  induced  by relative  price
changes  (for  example,  as a result  of real  excho_age  rate  adjustment),  by
improving  efficiency,  are  expected  to lessen  the  reduction  in output  that
would  result  from  stabilization  measures. If expenditure  switching  leads
to a supply  response,  a given  resource  balance  improvement  could  be
achieved  at less  cost  in terms  of foregone  growth  than  would  otherwise  be
the  case.- 24 -
Figure 3
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In the  first  half  of the  1980s,  import  compression  was the
dominant  force  behind  the  negative  resource  balance-GDP  relationship.
Figure  3 shows  the  strong  positive  link  between  import  growth  and  GDP
growth. Imports  can  affect  GDP  growth  in  at least  two  ways.  One  is
through  the  effect  of imports  on the  domestic  production  of competing
goods. Increased  competition  from  imports  hurts  inefficient  production
and  leads  over  time  to a  more  efficient  structure  of domestic  production.- 25 -
The  other  way is through  the  effect  of imported  inputs  --  raw  materials
and  intermediate  and  capital  goods  --  on production.  When domestic
savings  have  not  been easily  converted  into  foreign  exchange  for  imports,
the  relaxation  of import  controls  will  contribute  directly  to  higher  GDP.
Adjustment  lending  has supported  some  import  liberalization  and  has
provided  additional  financing  for  imports. Changes  in  trade  policy,
including  real  exchange  rate  adjustments,  have  been  expected  to boost  GDP
more than  would  the  increased  importation  of inputs  alone,  however.
To  assess  whether  adjustment  lending  has improved  performance,  we
investigate  whether  the import-GDP  relation  is significantly  different  for
loan  recipients  than  for  nonrecipients.  While  there  are  two-way  links
between  imports  and  GDP,  country  evidence  suggests  that  under  the  import
and  foreign  exchange  constraints  many  countries  faced  in  the  1980s,
changes  in imports  under  adjustment  programs  led  to  changes  in  GDP.  When
a  country  begins  from  a situation  of policy  restrictions,  efficiency  gains
will  accrue  from  policy  reforms  to  the  extent  that  resources  switch  among
exportable,  importable,  and  nontradable  sectors  and  the  shifts  in
resources  raise  their  net  marginal  product.
Four  effects  on GDP  are  considered:  those  from  an increase  in
imports,  those  from  terms  of trade  changes,  those  from  real  exchange  rate
changes,  and  those  from  commercial  policy  reform. The  impact  on GDP  of
increased  imports  is  expected  to  be positive  unless  the  negative  effect  on
import-competing  production  is  larger  than  the  positive  effect  from
greater  availability  of imported  inputs. An  improvement  in terms  of trade
is  also  expected  to increase  GDP. A depreciation  of the  real  exchange
rate  would  have  a positive  effect  on GDP  unless  the  increase  in tradable- 26 -
production  is offset  by the  decline  in  nontradable  production.  Commercial
policy  that  reduces  antiexport  blas  would  increase  GDP  unless  the  negative
effect  on importables  is larger  than  the  positive  effect  on exportables.
To illustrate  these  propositions  we consider  the  following
reduced  form  equationt
0  0  0 
(1)  GDPi  Po  + P 1 Ii  +  P2 TOTi  +  P3  RERi  +  P4  Di  +  PS Di  . i  + ei
where
I  - import  volume  of goods  and  nonfactor  services
TOT  - terms  of trade
RER  - real  exchange  rate
Di  '  dummy variable  for  commercial  policy  in  which  Di  - 1 for  the
trade  adjustment  countries  and  Di - 0 for  the  others.
e  - the  error  term,  which  is  assumed  to  be uncorrelated  with the
independent  variables  with  constant  variance
*  =  rate  of  change
The  four  independent  variables  are  postulated  to  be related  to  GDP in  a
log  linear  fashion. Estimations  were  performed  for  the  forty  trade
adjustment  loan  countries  versus  forty-eight  nonrecipients.  Estimations
were also  performed  for  a group  that  excluded  the  four  trade  loan
recipient  countries  with  no progress  or  a reversal  in  commercial  policy
versus  the  forty-eight  nonrecipients.  Finally,  we also  considered  a group
of thirty-eight  reformer  countries  (the  thirty-six  reformers  within  Ahe
group  of trade  loan  recipients  plus  Bolivia  and  Haiti,  which  carried  out- 27 -
trade  reforms  without  adjustment  loans)  versus  the  remaining  fifty
"nonreformers.
Table  6 provides  the  results  of ordinary  least  squares
estimations  for  the  eighty-eight  developing  countries. Changes  during
1985-87  versus  1981-83  are  compared  in  panel  I and  three  years  after  the
loan  versus  three  years  before  in  panel  2.  Changes  in imports  were  found
to be a strong  determinant  of changes  in  GDP  growth,  presumably  because  of
the  importance  of foreign  exchange  and  import  constraints.  The  estimated
coefficient  of I suggests  that  a 10-percent  increase  (recovery)  in imports
is  associated  with  a  more than  1.5-percent  increase  (recovery)  in  GDP.
The  contribution  to  GDP  of  changes  in imports  also  appears  greater  in the
presence  of reform  under  trade  adjustment  lending,  as indicated  by the
coefficient  of the  dummy  variable  D for  a trade  adjustment  loan  country
(p4).  In  other  words,  the  results  suggest  that  the  import-GDP  relation,
such  as that  depicted  in  figure  3, shifts  up in the  presence  of policy
reform. The significance  of the  coefficient  of the  dummy  variable  (p4)  is
stronger  when reformers  are  compared  with  nonreformers.  The  results
suggest  that  trade  adjustment  loans  contribute  to the  import-GDP  relation
not  only  through  the  financing  of additional  imports  but  also  through  the
effect  of  policy  change  on efficiency.
The  additional  impact  on GDP  growth  of real  exchange  rate
depreciation  (defined  as a decrease)  is  positive. It is  not  significant
in  the  simultaneous  presence  of the  dummy  variable,  presumably  because  of
the  high correlation  between  the  two  variables. The  coefficient  of the
slope  dummy  (p5)  turned  out  to  be insignificant  (not  shown  in the  table).Table  6.  CDP  GroWth. Imports,  and Effect  of  PolIcy  Reform
No.
DepAdrat  variable:  GOP  Conatant  I  TOT  RR  D  R2  F-stat  of  ob*.
Pnawl 1:  116547 cemperd to  1961-a
(1)  Dz m:  1 *  40 reciplnte  -0.21  0.15  0.01  -0.02  1.05  O.3  11.9  so
0 a  4U monr.clpiet  (-0.34)  (4.67)  (0.53)  (-1.17)  (1.16)
(ii)  -0.29  0.14  0.01  1.40  O.35  11.  79
(-0.U)  (5.30)  (0.48)  (1.71)
(lit)  0.26  0.15  0.02  -0.03  0.34  11.6  72
(0.56)  (4.72)  (0.70)  (-1.57)
(I)  2Z:  1 *  U6 referoerc  -0.36  0.15  0.01  -0.02  1.43  0.87  9.9  72
0  a0  *4  rerrfofe  b  (-0."6)  (4.55)  (0.56)  (-1.24)  (1.76)
(tl)  -0.39  0.16  0.01  1.s  O.a6  14.1  79
(-0.72)  (5.33)  (0.52)  (2.10)
Pin1  2:  Three yae  after  compared
to  three  yar  beforer
(i)  Dm!:  1 *  40 rec)pleak  -0.18  0.18  0.04  -0.02  0.11  0.44  11.9  44
0  *  41 m.ar.ciplnt  (0.29)  (5.14)  (1.50)  (-1.19)  (0.12)
(11)  -0.21  0.13  0.04  0.46  0.41  15.5  72
(4.37)  (5.73)  (1.62)  (0.52)
(Iii)  -0.13  0.16  0.04  -0.02  0.44  16.2  66
(-0.27)  (5.16)  (1.61)  (-1.26)Tabl  S.  CDP  Growthb  Imports,  and Effect  of  Policy  Reform (cont d)
No.
Depeadmat  variable:  U  Ce.taot  I  TOT  nRo  D  02  F-stat  of  obs.
(i)  gm:  1 a  SO rformersr  -0.59  0.17  0.06  -002  1.17  0.46  12.7  a
0 * C0  Deroforerob  (-1.00)  (5.04)  (1.79)  (-1.09)  (1.31)
(II)  -O."  0.17  0.05  1.87  0.43  16.3  72
(-.07)  (5.52)  (1.01)  (1.10)
Ne":  t-.tatistice  Ore *Ithin  bracheta.
s.  Exeludimg  Guyna.  Tgoplavis  Zemblo,  and Zimbebme  from  the  group  of  forty  trado  loan recipiiete,  but  Including  the  monrociplent
reforwe  Belivia  ad  Hliti.
b.  Excludlg  Bolivia  ad Hmitt from th,  group of  fortyelght  aonrecipiate  but  including  the  four  countries  listed  in  footnote  a.
c.  1994 Is  the  reforace  year for  noenreciplanta.
'0- 30 -
Finally  the,  coefficient  of TOT (p2)  has  the  expected  sign  and  mild
significance  in  most instances.
The  following  equations  consider  multicollinearity  among  the
independent  variables.
For  40 recipients  vs.  48  nonrecipients:
(2)  I - -2.48 +  0.21  TOT  -0.19 RER +  4.11  D
(-0.98) (1.87)  (-3.02)  (1.05)
2 R  -0.23,  F - 6.2,  obs  - 66
For  38 reformers  vs. 50  nonreformers:
(3)  I - -3.36  +  0.24  TOT  -0.19  RER +  6.63  D
(-1.41)  (2.11)  (-3.13)  (1.76)
2 R  - 0.26,  F  - 7.1,  obs  - 66
The  coefficients  of TOT  and  RER  are  significant.  While  this  is
suggestive  of an association  of  TOT  and  RER  with import  growth,  the  low
R2 also implies  their  independence  with respect  to import  growth. 11 The
coefficient  of the  dummy  variable  is  less  significant,  however,  which
suggests  that  the  effect  of the  dummy  variable  on  GDP is the  result  of
policy  impact  as  well  as of financing.  However,  the  dummy  variable  is
more likely  representative  of a set  of  macroeconomic  and sectoral  reforms
and  other  positive  factors  that  affect  growth  than  of trade  reform  per
se. 12
Conclusion
Overall,  implementation  of trade  policy  reform  has  been
moderately  significant  in the  sample  of developing  countries,  but  weaker- 31 -
than  expected. Reforms  have  occurred  in  ezchange  rate  policy  and  in the
reduction  of impediments  to  export,  including  reduction  in impediments  to
the  import  of inputs  needed  by exporters.  While  quantitative
restrictions  have  been  replaced  by tariffs  in  many countries,  success  in
lowering  quantitative  restrictions  has  been  more  modest  in  the face  of
foreign  exchange  constraints,  except  in selected  cases  (for  instance,
Chile,  Korea,  Mauritius,  and  Mexico). In some  cases  there  has  been  a
reduction  in effective  protection  for  importables  and  in  antiexport  bias
(for  example,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Philippines).  Domestic  reforms,  however,
have  lagged  even  in some  of the  major  trade  reformers  (for  example,
Mexico), and  institutionalization  of reforms  and  reductions  in
protection  levels  have  been  limited.
Given  the  strong  emphasis  on trade  policy  under  adjustment
lending,  one  might  expect  greater  reforms  of the  trade  regimes  than
actually  occurred  during  this  period. In  particular,  four  factors  have
constrained  reform: macroeconomic  instability,  inadequate  conviction
concerning  the  benefits  of reform  and  vested  interests  against  reform,
weak implementation  capacity,  and  conflicts  in  design. Institutional
reform  has  been  found  to  be particularly  slow,  while  price  reforms  have
not  always  been  sustained. These  issues  are  important  because
sustainable  price  changes  and  effective  institutional  support  are  vital
to  achieving  meaningful  supply  responses.
On nine  performance  indicators,  the  strongest  improvement  of
trade  loan  recipients  over  nonrecipients  in the  postloan  period  relative
to the  preloan  period  was in  growth  in  manufacturing  exports  and  in
imports. Less  progress  was  made  with respect  to debt  indicators.  For- 32 -
the  short  period  under  review,  the  overall  positive  evidence  is  modest.
In general,  the  more significant  improvements  concern  middle-income
countries. The  evidence  is also  more  favorable  ihen  early  loan
recipients  are  considered  (especially  when  only  the  ten  intensive  trade
loan  recipients  are  considered)  than  when  all forty  recipients  are
included  in  the  comparisons.
Regression  analyses  of  GDP  growth  rates  found  the  growth  in
output  to be associated  with the  contribution  of additional  imports,
presumably  because  foreign  exchange  shortages  had  been  a serious
constraint.  At the  same  time,  policy  reform  was found  to  have  a positive
impact  on growth  performance.  Countries  that  have  received  trade
adjustment  loans  have  experienced  a stronger  growth  impact  from
additional  imports  than  have  other  countries. The  evidence  of this
policy  impact  is  mild  when  all  trade  loan  recipients  are  compared  with
nonrecipients  but stronger  when reformers  are  compared  with  nonreformers.
Country  studies  corroborate  this  finding  as  well.  The  evidence  supports
the  need for  continued  and  stronger  efforts  to reform  trade  regimes  as
part  of adjustment  lending.  Although  not  analyzed  in  this  oaper  in  any
detail,  factors  other  than  trade  policy  are  also  important  in
complementing  and sustaining  trade  reform. Thus,  greater  efforts  in
trade  reform  will be beneficial  for  adjustment  and  growth,  but  their
impacts  will  be stronger  if  attention  is  paid  to  complementary  policies.- 33 -
Notes
1.  Export  restrictions  have included  prohibitions  based  on economic  or
safety  grounds,  restrictive  licensing,  export  quotas,  export  taxes,
and  regulations  limiting  foreign  exchange  retention.
2.  Quantitative  restrictions  have  included  import  prohibitions,  quotas,
and  restrictive  licensing  of  various  sorts. Other  restrictions
include  foreign  exchange  licensing  and  control,  advance  import  deposit
requirements,  and  restricted  import  channels  (as  in the  case  of a
state  trading  monopoly.)
3.  In  addition  to  customs  duties,  customs  charges  include  customs
surcharges,  surtaxes,  stamp  taxes,  and  taxes  on foreign  exchange.
4.  The sources  were reports  on recommendations  for  loans,  country
memoranda,  country  briefs,  audit  reports,  mission  reports,  background
work for  World  Bank (1988),  DMF  reports,  and  the  Ford  Foundation
project  on trade  policy  and  the  developing  world.  Sufficiently  large
differences  were  detected  to  permit  such  a broad  classification.
5.  When 'secondary  trade  restrictive  intent'  is included,  the  figure
rises  to 27.2  percent;  estimates  for  imports  "affected,'  rather  than
covered,  are  higher  still  --  48  percent  instead  of 27.2.
6.  These  proposals  are  grounded  In the  conceptual  and  empirical  work  of
many  trade  policy  analysts;  see,  for  example,  Balassa  (1988);  Bhagwati
(1978);  Corden  (1974);  Krueger  (1978);  and  Little,  Scitovsky,  and
Scott  (1970).
7.  While  the  achievement  of a real  depreciation  clearly  depended  on
macroeconomic  adjustments  (fiscal,  monetary,  and  wage),  this  chapter
focuses  only  on exchange  rate  policy  identified  under  trade  adjustment
lending.
8.  When quantitative  restrictions  are  binding  before  and  after  the
depreciation,  however,  the  depreciation  increases  the  price  of
exportables  relative  to importables.
9.  For  most indicators  a  positive  change  is an improvement.  For  resource
balance/GDP,  external  debt/exports,  and  debt  service/exports,  a
positive  change  is a  worsening  and  is  indicated  in  the  table  by a
minus. For  the  real  exchange  rate,  a greater  real  depreciation  for
recipients  between  periods  than  that  for  comparators  is  an
improvement.
10.  Sample  selectivity  bias is  likely  to come  into  play  here  in that
changes  in  performance  attributed  to the  receipt  of a loan  may reflect
conditions  that  systematically  led  to the  receipt  of the  loan.- 34 -
11.  Since  a  depreciation  is  defined  as  a decrease  in the  RER  in this
analysis,  a  positive  sign  on the  coefficient  of RER  would  be expected
if equations  vii  and  viii in  table  6  were demand  functions  of I.
12. That is,  there  may  be  an  additional  dependent  term  P6 zi  in  equatioa
1,  so  that  E  (p) - P  + P6  7.  where  7  is  the  coefficient  of a
regression  of Zi on  Di.  The  term  Zj  could  represent  characteristics
other  than  trade  reforms.- 35  -
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Annex  1
Efficiency  Gains  from  Trade  Refoun
Domestic  value  added  is  comprised  of the  value  added  in
exportables  (x),  in importables (m)  --  with  x and  m comprising
tradeables,  t - and  in nontradeables (n) at  their  respective prices
Px'  Pm  and  Pn.  In the  short-  to  medium-term,  the  production of  each
category  is  thought  to  be constrained  by  variable  domestic  inputs
represented  by L, and  imported  inputs I.  Expressing all  prices  in
terms  of the  price  of importables  P'.
m
(1) GDP  - PxQx  (Lx,I  )  +  C  (L  ,I )  +  PnQn (L  ,I1)
where  GDP  is the  aggregate  value  added,  and  the  Pi Qis  are  the  sectoral
value  added  in i  - x,  m and  n, all  at  constant  prices. The  use  of
domestic  resources  Li in  x and  m are  dependent  on the  terms  of trade  Px'
tariffs  and  subsidies  on exports  and  imports  7, and  total  resources  in
tradeables  Lt.  In  turn,  Lt is  determined  by the  relative  price  of
tradeables with respect  to  non-tradeables,  or the  real  exchange  rate
RER, inclusive  of equal  import  tariffs  cum  export  subsidies  (i.e.
inclusive  of  net taxation  of trade). Thus  7  would  only include  the
differential  trade  policy  components.  Changes  in  Px and  7  are  assumed
not  to  affect Lt,  but  only  Lx and  Lm.  Domestic resources in  non-
tradeables Ln  is  determined by the  total  domestic  resources  L  and  Lt;
full  employment  is  assumed.
(2) Lx - F (Px'  7,  Lt)
(3) Lm - G (Px,  7.  Lt)
(4) Lt - H (RER)
(5) Ln  - L - Lt
In initial  equilibrium,  veal  wages  across  the  three  sectors  are
the  same.  The  produc.t  prices  and  the  marginal  products  can  change  from
three  sources: (i) *xternal  factors,  specifically  represented  by terms
of trade  changes;  (ii)  import  growth,  through  changes  in  non-competing
imported  inputs  in  domestic  production  of final  goods,  I1,  as  well  as in
any  imports  competing  with local  production,  12;  and (iii)  policy  changes- 38 -
represented  specifically  by real  exchange  rate  and  commercial  policy
changes. In  order  to restore  real  wage  equilibrium,  domestic  resources
(Li)  move across  sectors  thereby  changing  GDP.  Differentiating  (1)
partially  with respect  to each  of the  exogenous  changes,  we obtain  four
hypothesized  relationships.
First,  we consider  the  effect  on  GDP  of changes  in imports. If
the  marginal  product  of Il in each  i is  the  same,  and  if changes  in
domestic  resources  used in  the  import-competing  sector  and  the  exportable
sector  come  entirely  from  each  othert
-6)  aGDP  (p  + P  + 1) Boi  +  (P  x  L  m)  -Lx
81 x  n  8~1  x  OLx  8m  12
Direct  effect  Induced  net effect
of  changes  in  of  changes  in imported
imported  +  products  on tradeable
inputs  in  GDP  production
Next,  we turn  to the  effect  on GDP  of  changes  in the  terms  of
trade,  TOT,  defined  as the  exportable  price  index  divided  by the
importable  price  index. Assuming again  that  changes  in  resource  use in
the  exportables  and  the  importable  sector  come  from  each  other,  and
noting  that  Px is the  terms  of trade,  we consider  the  effect  on GDP  of  a
change  in  terms  of trade  resulting  from  a change  in  P' or P': x  m
(7) 8GDP  +  (P A8Qx  aQm)  LX  +  Qn apn
BP  QQn 8 LBL  OPo x  x  m  x  x
Direct  effect  of  Induced  net  effect  Change  in  the
TOT  change  on  +  of  TOT  change  on  +  non-tradeable
value  of exportable  tradeable  production
production  production  valued  at Pm]
The  effect  of a  change  in  the  real  exchange  rate,  defined  as the
price  of tradeables  divided  by the  price  of nontradeables,  is  considered
next. Noting  that  Ln  - L  Lt,- 39 -
(8) OGDP  , (p  fQs  + fQm  p  OA)  ALt  +  OPn
SRER  xL  t  8Lt  n  8Lt  RER  QnaRER
Difference  between  change  Change  in  non-
in tradeable  production  tradeable
and  nontradeable  produc-  +  production
tion  from  resource  shift  valued  at Pm
Finally,  we turn  to the  effect  of a change  in commercial  policy,
7,  that  changes  the  price  of exportables  relative  to importables.
(9  aGDP  (PM  OM  Li
9)  67  (x aLx  aLm  F7
Difference  between




The  effect  on GDP  in  equation  (6)  is expected  to  be positive
unless  the  induced  net  effect  is  negative  and  large  enough  to offset  the
direct  positive  effect. The  same  can  be said  of the  effect  in  equation
(7). The  effect  of a depreciation  in  RER  in (8)  would  be positive  unless
the  increase  in tradeable  production  is  offset  by the  decline  in
nontradeable  production;  there  is  the  additional  effect  of a change  in
the  valuation  of  non-tradeable  production.  A commercial  policy  change
that  reduces  the  anti-export  b,as  in (9)  would  have  a positive  effect
unless  the  negative  effect  on importables  is larger  than  the  positive
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